Based on a conference held Apr. 4-5, 2008 at Amherst College.

The argument from potential has been hard to assess because the versions presented by friends and those presented by enemies have born very little resemblance to each other. I here try to improve this situation by attempting to bring both versions into enforced contact. To this end, I sketch a more detailed analysis of the modern concept of potential than any hitherto attempted. As one would expect, arguments from potential couched in terms of that notion are evident non-starters. I then (...) ask how the modern notion of potential needs to be supplemented in order to produce a more convincing argument. I then enquire whether the supplementations utilised in the most distinguished recent presentations of the argument have anything better than an ad hoc role to play in contemporary metaphysics. I conclude that the rehabilitation of the argument is unlikely; in any event, the onus of proof seems to be on the friend of that argument to show that it is uncontrived. Finally, I argue that the (modern) notion of potential has an important role to play in any plausible account of foetal value. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in (...) the cerebral cortex which can be ascertained through EEG readings. Second, we isolate from other notions of a‘functioning brain’that which is required to underpin the view that a cortex is functioning in a way which could give rise to rudimentary conscious experiences. We investigate the development in the human fetus of the anatomical and chemical pathways which underpin (immature) cortical activity and the growth and maturation of the electrical circuitry specifically associated with sensational content in adult experience. We conclude (tentatively) that a fetus becomes conscious at about 30 to 35 weeks after conception; an answer based on a careful analysis of EEG readings at various stages of cortical development. Finally, we survey the possible ethical ramifications of our answer. (shrink)

New uses of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to screen embryos prior to transfer raise ethical, legal, and policy issues that deserve close attention. Extensions for medical purposes, such as to identify susceptibility genes, late onset disease, and human leukocyte antigen matching, are usually ethically acceptable. Whether embryo screening for gender, perfect pitch, or other non-medical characteristics are also acceptable depends upon the parental needs served and the harm posed to embryos, children, and society. Speculations about potential future uses of PGD should (...) not prevent otherwise acceptable current uses of PGD. (shrink)

I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The (...) inferences we actually use to establish the applicability of, e.g., colour concepts are designed to establish warranted assertability and not truth. Understood thus, dispositional analyses are not inferentially circular. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dostoevsky, Girard, LevinasApocalyptic Frenzy and Eschatological Ethics in Dostoevsky's DevilsJ. A. Jackson (bio)In his interview with René Girard, Benoît Chantre connects the mimetic theory of René Girard with the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, observing, "It is in the confrontation with otherness that the individual acquires self-consciousness. The self has no meaning except in the relationship, even when the relationship takes the form of a duel. Can we not say, (...) following Levinas, that only experience of war can allow us to think about reconciliation?" Girard concurs and expands: "According to what you have said, Levinas saw the duel, like love, as an escape from totality that we absolutely need. However, it is in this sense that it explodes totality…. By affirming that the duel is already the relationship to the Other, it shows that the relationship sits at the heart of violent reciprocity."1 How fitting that a discussion regarding the thought of Girard and Levinas should center at some point on the duel, an act of violence, of course, and yet an event also pregnant with ethical implications, as rivals must respond face-to-face. Perhaps we should not be so surprised that our two thinkers should fashion the duel as both a temptation to murder and the command "Thou shalt [End Page 227] not murder"; both men have a deep love and sense of indebtedness to the Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, a man in whose works the duel—both literal and relational—often plays a crucial narrative, and penitential, role.As the conversation between Chantre and Girard reveals, the pairing of Girard and Levinas seems wholly natural and still much underappreciated.2 Dostoevsky seems to be a natural interlocutor, as one cannot help but feel Dostoevsky's hyperbolic excessiveness coursing through the works of both Girard and Levinas. To read Dostoevsky now, thanks to Girard, one cannot help but be dazzled by Dostoevsky's genius regarding mimetic desire and modern man's underground psychology, the very foundations for Girard's notion of the Apocalyptic. To read Levinas means having the notion of infinite responsibility illumined by Dostoevsky's beautiful religious meditations, where previously one may have only seen Dostoevsky's relishing the idea of the impossible, a mixture of monastic asceticism, Karamozovan passion, and Dostoevsky's own romantic proclivities.3 In this essay, I wish to pursue a reading of Dostoevsky's Devils with Girard's thoughts on apocalypticism and mimetic frenzy—with its inherent focus on the human "political" community—on one side. This is, in turn, partnered with Levinas's sense of the eschatological as an anarchic response to history and politics, with ethics being prior to both politics and history. Most importantly, however, I want to offer my own reading of Dostoevsky and investigate his own position inside of this exchange. To this end, alongside Levinas's idea of eschatology, especially as spelled out in Totality and Infinity, and Girard's often understated, yet very-much-present notion of positive mimesis (love), I also investigate Dostoevsky's notion of kenosis, a key idea in Dostoevsky's anthropology, psychology, and theology.René Girard has always maintained that he did not invent his mimetic theory—that he simply needed only to listen to what great authors like Cervantes, Dante, Shakespeare, Proust, and, especially, Dostoevsky had to say about desire. Indeed, Dostoevsky maintains a central position in Girard's first book, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, and is his only subject matter in Resurrection from the Underground. The connection between Girard and Dostoevsky became even more profound for Girard: "When I wrote the last chapter of my first book, I had a vague idea of what I would do, but as the chapter took form I realized I was undergoing my own version of the experience I was describing. I was particularly attracted to the Christian elements, for example, Stepan Verkhovensky's final journeys and turn to the Gospel before his death. So I began to read the Gospels and the rest of the bible. And I turned into a Christian."4 One can find in much of Girard's meditations on Dostoevsky the seeds of so many [End Page 228] of his... (shrink)

In a previous article an elementary semantic analysis showed that, logically, analogical terms and expressions must be treated as homonyms, though of a special type. The latter qualification is necessitated by the concomitant element of similarity that is found to be involved in all comparisons of the analogical type. Further, it was pointed out that the special types of similarity in question cannot be isolated through a purely semantic analysis. This is, in particular, a consequence of the fact that analogy (...) is itself an analogical notion and term. The kind of similarity involved may, therefore, vary in the different forms of analogy and it may prove impossible to abstract from these something like a common element, e.g., a particular type of resemblance. This implies that the full philosophical significance of a particular form of analogy can be gleaned only from a contextual examination of its rôle in relation to a particular problem. Nevertheless, some significant conclusions may emerge from a partial analysis of certain forms of resemblance which are usually associated with analogy. (shrink)

The historic task of Leibniz was to furnish a philosophy of personality, and at the same time, and in harmony with it, a general interpretation of the physical world. He conceives therefore of a plurality of Real Beings which in their most developed form he proposes to call individuals, defining individuality in terms of unique experience. Further, he finds the monads, or so-called metaphysical points, to be centres of life, held together by their own inner or intensive force and therefore (...) impenetrable. Consequently, when we enquire whether the Real Beings are parts of the universe, we find that since the universe is the aggregate of monadic forces, all Real Being is finite, and so in order to deal with the problem of Theism we have to reconcile the concept of divine personality with what we may define as personality in the case of human beings. (shrink)

The author examines and discusses berkeley's statement: "the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction." (staff).

It will, I suppose, be readily agreed that questions concerning the scope of moral principles are of vital importance for the moral philosopher. If we are to accept a view, such as Professor Hare's, that there are formal criteria for any morality if it is to count as a morality, then it is necessary to know what is left outside the fence. Are Egoism and Caste Morality to count as moralities, restricted to the interests of one and of a limited (...) group of persons respectively; or is there a logical absurdity in calling them moralities at all? Hare's thesis of ‘prescriptive universalisability’, as definitive of the formal structure of any moral system, rules out such restricted ‘moralities’. Using ‘ought’ as a key-concept in moral discourse, Hare suggests that the word has two basic functions: to prescribe: meaning to commend courses of action sincerely to oneself and others. to prescribe consistently, or universalisably; that is, in the same way, on relevantly similar occasions, to anyone, including oneself, unless valid reasons for discrimination of persons can be offered. (shrink)

B erkeley wrote of ‘the absolute existence of unthinking things’ as being, ‘words which are without meaning and including a contradiction’. There are few philosophers today who do not regard Berkeley as having been mistaken in this view, in that it is regarded as clearly not meaningless to suppose that there might be many objects about which no one happens to be thinking. Nor is it the aim of this paper entirely to resurrect such a view, though it is my (...) purpose to try to show the subtlety of the logical and ontological issues involved in the problem of independent things. (shrink)

When we from what may be called Aristotle's Cosmology turn to his work traditionally called the Metaphysics, we are faced with something—an inquiry or doctrine—of a surprisingly different character. There what we find is the exposition of a sort or degree of knowledge superior to that of the Sciences. This is what we call his metaphysics, but he does not so name it; he names it Wisdom, or Theoretical Wisdom. At times he calls it First Philosophy, or, again, Theology. It (...) is par excellence knowledge, the consummate achievement of theoretic or cognitive power. It is the supreme Science, scientia scientiarum. Of what is it knowledge? It is knowledge not about, but of, whatsoever is real, really real, and of its universal and necessary attributes. The latter are distinct from one another, and from that to which they indissolubly belong, and metaphysics apprehends all this in its distinctions and interconnections. Further, it is a knowledge of itself, a knowledge of knowledge, and so a Wissenschaftslehre, or“super-Logic.” Finally, it is knowledge commensurate with the real Universe as a whole, so that nothing which is genuinely a part of that escapes its view. (shrink)

In beginning to speak of Euripides in this University of Manchester, one's thoughts naturally turn to the work of Professor Norwood in this direction, and it is with an especially keen sense of pleasure that I find myself not only following in his footsteps—a long way after!—but helping in a small way to contribute some further confirmation to the views on Euripides established by him and Professor Verrall.